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During the past several years considerable criti

cism has been leveled at business on the score of its
annual reports to stockholders.

The criticism has not

concerned the quality of design and typography, or of
charts and four-color photographs.

Although these features

of reports may have become counterproductive through over
use, it is the financial statements which are the target.

Blame is directed not only at managements but also at the
accounting profession for not imposing stricter reporting

rules.

It is not the purpose of this article to rehearse
the criticisms nor to assess their validity.

Rather, the

purpose is to show that there has been progress in corporate

financial reporting and that, in total, it is impressive.
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As in many other areas, however, progress here
has resulted from a series of moves.

The effect on an

observer, therefore, is like that from watching the hands

of a clock:

there seems to be little or no movement unless

one compares positions over a fairly extended period.

This article will examine the progress achieved

in the period between the wayward Twenties and now; much

of this progress has been brought about by the SEC, some
by corporate financial executives, and a great deal by
the accounting profession.

The article also will indicate

some of the areas in which further improvement is in order.

In 1926 William Z. Ripley, a professor of eco
nomics at Harvard, caused a stir with a bristling attack

in The Atlantic Monthly on the inadequacy of corporate
financial reporting of that era.

To illustrate the atti

tude of some managements, Ripley cited a paragraph from the
annual report of a company he did not identify:
The settled plan of the directors

has been to withhold information from the

stockholders and others that is not called
for by the stockholders in a body.

So far

no request for information has been made in
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the manner prescribed by the directors.

Distribution of stock has not meant
distribution of control.

After describing deficiencies in other annual

reports, resulting presumably from the same sort of thinking,
Ripley wrote:

"Stockholders are entitled to adequate infor

mation and the State and the general public have a right to

the same privilege.”
There were others who shared Ripley’s concern
about the ’’limitless obfuscation” of financial reporting
in the Twenties.

Among them were some leading certified

public accountants who suggested to the New York Stock

Exchange that the accounting profession and the Exchange
collaborate in drawing up reporting standards for listed

companies.
The proposal brought no action at the time.

But

with the Great Depression, attitudes changed, and discussions

between the Exchange and the accounting profession, begun
in 1932, culminated in 1934 in publication of "Audits of

Corporate Accounts.”
This proved to be a seminal document.

Not only

did it set forth principles to be followed in financial

reporting, it also led to the first standard form of auditor’s

report and to a requirement that the financial statements

-4-

of companies applying for listing with the Exchange be
independently audited.

Meanwhile, Congress passed the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which provided

for federal regulation of securities sales.

The function

was undertaken by the Federal Trade Commission in 1933 but
was soon transferred to the new Securities and Exchange

Commission set up by the 1934 Act.

In line with the

arrangement being worked out by the CPAs and the Stock

Exchange, companies subject to reporting under the securities

acts were required to be audited by independent public
accountants.
While the securities acts empowered the Commission

to prescribe accounting practices for publicly held companies,
the Commission made known that it expected the accounting

profession itself to assume the main burden of rule-setting.
Accordingly, the American Institute of Certified Public

Accountants, in an effort to bring more consistency to
corporate reporting and to discourage undesirable practices,
formed in 1939 a Committee on Accounting Procedure

which was authorized to issue formal pronouncements.
One of the Committee’s first efforts was to

restrict the recording, on balance sheets, of the appreciated
value of assets.

It was not uncommon in the Twenties for
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companies to write up plants and properties to appraised

values, and in some instances the increments were substan

tial.

Whereas today’s investor generally gives more weight

to income statements than to balance sheets when evaluating

companies, the reverse was true in the Twenties and Thirties,

so the writing up of fixed assets had substantial impact on

Moreover, the practice could be highly mis

stock prices.

leading since managements were not likely to order new
appraisals of physical assets when the economy dipped and the

assets would have to be written down.1
In 1940 the Committee on Accounting Procedure

issued a bulletin that fixed assets should normally be
stated at cost.

Further, in cases where companies had booked

assets at appreciated values on their balance sheets, income
should be charged with depreciation computed on the new

higher values.
Also in 1940, the Committee on Accounting Procedure
recommended that income statements and balance sheets in

annual reports to stockholders should be given not just

for the year under review but for the prior year as well.
Thus investors would have a benchmark for judging current

performance.

In the course of time, comparative presentation

of financial statements to stockholders became virtually

1The SEC, from its beginning, would not accept financial
statements in which fixed assets were stated at appreciated
values.
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standard practice and, in 1967, the SEC ruled that companies
subject to its proxy rules had to include comparative state

ments in their annual reports.
For the same purpose of providing investors with indi

cations of trends, the annual reports of most major corporations
today include tables of "highlights” covering five to ten years
or more.

Neither the SEC nor the accounting profession speci

fies that this information be in annual reports to stockholders,
although the SEC does require that a summary of earnings for

at least five years be included in registration statements and
has recently extended the requirement to other reports filed
with the Commission.

Even though the SEC requirement does not apply to
annual reports to stockholders, many companies apparently have
decided that highlight figures for a number of years are use
ful to stockholders and, as a result, the rank-and-file
investor today is provided with a range of data that would

have been unthinkable to earlier generations of management.

In 1971 it is hard to believe that in annual reports
of thirty or forty years ago the volume of a company’s sales

and the cost of sales were often not disclosed.

But the

fact is that many managements gave only a net profit figure.

Their explanation, or rationalization, was that to reveal

sales volumes and costs would be to give weapons to competitors.2
A
2 similar argument is sometimes used still to block proposals
for improved reporting, especially proposals for presenting
operating results for separate lines of business.
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The SEC from its earliest days required disclosure

of sales and cost of sales in filings.

This requirement

was challenged during the Thirties when the American Sumatra

Tobacco Company asked that it be exempted from disclosure
in a filing it was making.
the company brought suit.

The SEC denied the request, and

The decision by the court that

heard the case, handed down in 1940, upheld the Commission,

and since then the reporting of sales and cost of sales
has become a nearly universal practice.
In years past it was not unusual to see annual
reports in which a charge was made against income to pro

vide some kind of contingency reserve.

The presumed con

tingency might be only tenuously related to events of the

period being reported or, indeed, highly conjectural.

The reserve against it, however, made possible an
understatement of income for one period and, by being taken

back into income subsequently, an overstatement in a later

period.

In this way, reported income could be made to

reflect not the true course of the company’s fortunes but

arbitrary decisions by management.
In 1947 the Committee on Accounting Procedure

called for an end to charging income to provide reserves
against contingencies which were vague or not reasonably

-8-

related to current operations, declaring that if a contin

gency reserve was set up, it should be created by appro
priation from earned surplus.

Over a span of two decades the Committee on
Accounting Procedure issued fifty-one bulletins, of which

those described above are just a sample of the more impor

tant.

Although the bulletins were only recommendations of

preferred accounting methods and were not binding on members

of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
they were accepted and followed so generally that their
influence on corporate reporting was far-reaching.

In light of a widening investing public and of
innovations in business, the American Institute in 1959

formed the Accounting Principles Board (APB) to carry on
the work of the former Committee on Accounting Procedure

more intensively and with greater research resources.
At the outset, the APB addressed itself to ques
tions of accounting philosophy, a course which a number of

persons both inside and outside the profession considered
an unwise diversion of effort.

In any event, the Board did

not issue the first of its pronouncements, which are termed

"Opinions,” until 1962.

Opinion

1 set guidelines for the

handling of several important aspects of depreciation.
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Provision in the Revenue Act of 1962 of an
"investment credit" to stimulate capital outlays by busi

ness raised a problem of accounting which had not been
encountered before.

A good theoretical case could be made

for regarding the credit as a reduction in current tax

liability (leading to recognition of the full credit in a
single year) or for regarding it as a reduction in the cost

of the purchased equipment (leading to spreading of the
benefit over the equipment’s life).
The APB took the position that, while either
method could be justified, it was not logical to accept

both the "flow-through" and "spreading" methods as alterna
tives.

Opinion 2 therefore specified "spreading" as the

only acceptable accounting treatment.

Soon thereafter,

however, the SEC announced it would accept corporate finan

cial statements using either of the two treatments, and the
APB, with the ground cut out from under it, rescinded
Opinion 2.

Opinion 3, issued in 1963, declared that a state

ment of source and application of funds was desirable in
corporate annual reports as "supplementary information."
Such statements are useful to investors in that they plainly

bring out financial information that can be extracted from
the income statement and balance sheet with difficulty if
at all.
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While Opinion 3 merely recommended funds statements,
Opinion 19, issued this year, holds that such a statement is
a necessary accompaniment of an income statement and a

balance sheet in making "fair presentation” of a company’s
accounts in an annual report.
Opinion 19 also lists the items that should go into

a funds statement, or statement of changes in financial
position as it is now called, and describes the kinds of

captions that should be used, thereby stymieing attempts to
divert attention from net income by emphasizing cash flow.

The APB next turned to preventing the use of leases
to produce financial statements that did not give an

accurate picture.

Back in 1949 the old Committee on Account

ing Procedure had issued a bulletin pointing out that, under

some circumstances, leases were tantamount to installment
purchases.

Therefore, the bulletin said, the "leased”

property should be included among the lessee’s assets, with
suitable accounting for the corresponding liabilities and
related charges in the income statement.

During the Fifties and Sixties it became increas

ingly common for companies to sell a factory, store, or
warehouse to a purchaser from whom the seller had already

agreed to lease back the property.

In some cases, the

purchaser might be a real estate company formed by the
seller for the sole purpose of carrying out the plan.
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Since the sales price of the property was usually

higher than its original cost less depreciation, the effect

was to transform what had been carried as a balance sheet

asset into revenue on the income statement.

Against this,

the seller would show as expense only the rent paid for

the year.

Opinion 5 prevented reporting gains on sale-and-

leaseback transactions as income, by requiring that they be
spread over the life of the lease as an adjustment of the

rental cost.

Opinion 5 also set criteria for determining whether
a lease should be accounted as an installment purchase.

Some leases which would not be considered purchases if the
two parties were unrelated, were so regarded if the parties
were related.

For transactions that qualified as bona fide

leases and where the amounts involved were material, finan

cial statements would have to contain enough information
to enable a reader to assess the effect of the commitments
upon the financial position and results of operations, both

present and prospective, of the lessee.

Besides minimum

annual rentals, necessary information might include type
of property leased, obligations assumed or guarantees made,
and provisions such as restrictions on dividends or unusual
options.

In a later Opinion, the APB declared that the

financial statements of a subsidiary company whose principal
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business was to lease property to a parent company or other

affiliates should be consolidated in the parent’s accounts.
The purpose of this ruling was to prevent attempts to

improve a company’s credit rating by transferring a mortgaged

property to a subsidiary, thereby removing debt from the
parent company’s books.

Until 1967 one source of noncomparability in
reported earnings, not only as between companies but as
between different years in the same company, was the treat

ment of pension funds.

The number of people embraced by

such plans has increased during the past thirty years from

slightly over 4 million in 1940 to possibly 30 million
today.

With employer payments into the programs amounting

to more than $9 billion annually, variations in accounting

for the costs can have great impact on reported earnings.
The old Committee on Accounting Procedure dealt
with pension costs twice:

one bulletin stated that costs

for past services should not be charged to surplus but to

current and future earnings, and another said that pension
costs should be accounted for on an accrual basis and
according to actuarial computations.
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These were forward steps but still left a great
deal of latitude.

In a year of good earnings, a company

could make a large payment into its pension fund, then if
next year’s earnings were flat or down, payment could be
omitted.

Some of the nation’s largest companies did that

in the 1950’s.

Also, if the market value of a pension

fund’s investment portfolio went up, the appreciation could
be considered a substitute for a current payment into the

fund.
In 1966 the APB dealt exhaustively with pension

fund accounting.

In Opinion 8 the Board took the position

that when a company adopts a formal pension plan, it assumes
long-term obligations that should not be handled by a series

of ad hoc steps.
The Opinion therefore called for pension charges
against each year’s income according to a consistent pattern.

If a change in actuarial assumptions resulted in a plan’s
having more funds than necessary to meet its liabilities,
the accounting gain could not be taken in a lump but would

have to be spread over a period of years.

Even companies

that did not actually accumulate funds to meet pension require
ments but operated their plains on a pay-as-you-go basis
would have to account for pension expense in the same way
as companies with funded plans.
The Opinion further stated that annual reports to

stockholders should disclose the existence of pension
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funds and how they are funded, the amount of pension cost
for the year, and changes in actuarial assumptions or

accounting methods.
The most appropriate accounting treatment for

extraordinary gains and losses — those arising from trans

actions outside a company’s regular lines of business -was long a matter of debate among accountants.

The sale

or abandonment of a plant is a good example of an event
which produces a result not attributable to ordinary

operations.

Companies had an option on how they would report
an extraordinary gain or loss.

They could take the amount

into retained earnings or include it in income.

Not un

naturally, there was a tendency to record losses as a
reduction of retained earnings (where most investors,

including fairly sophisticated ones, would pay little

attention to it) and to report gains in the income state

ment.

In the latter case, a company whose earnings from

normal operations were uninspiring might be able to show

a rise in net income more encouraging to investors.
APB Opinion 9 specified that extraordinary gains
and losses must be shown on the income statement.

Companies

reporting such items must show first the net income or loss

from ordinary operations, then the extraordinary gain or

loss, then the sum of the two.

If there is more than one
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extraordinary item, the nature and amounts of each must be

disclosed.

Ever since there has been a broad public interest
in the stock market, there has been a corresponding interest
in earnings-per-share figures.

And for the same length of

time, certified public accountants have been telling the
public not to concentrate single-mindedly on this one

number.

The CPAs have not said that e.p.s. should.be

ignored but that there are many other factors to consider

in judging a company’s performance.
Nevertheless, the public, in keeping with the

deep human desire to have simple rules-of-thumb for com
plex matters, continued to be fascinated by earnings per

share.

The figures were mentioned prominently in presi

dent’s letters to stockholders and featured on the business
pages of newspapers.
Of course, insofar as the efforts that have been
described above improved the calculation of net income as

a total figure, they tended to improve also the reliability
of earnings-per-share figures.

But more was needed — some

guidelines had to be set for the calculation of earningsper-share figures themselves.
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A difficulty, however, was that the only part

of an annual report on which CPAs pass judgment as inde
pendent auditors is the formal financial statements.

And, in keeping with their view as to the limited useful
ness of earnings-per-share figures, CPAs had never called
for them to be included in the formal statements.

Instead,

the e.p.s. numbers appeared in the president’s letter, the

"highlights of the year,” or some other section of an annual
report not subject to auditor’s review.

Sometimes, the

earnings per share thus featured were not ones the auditors
would have approved.

Accordingly Opinion 9, which as described earlier

•dealt also with extraordinary items, strongly recommended,
but did not require, that earnings per share be disclosed
in income statements.

Thus the e.p.s. figures would come

within the scope of an auditor’s examination.

The e.p.s. problem was accentuated by the fact
that, in numerous corporate acquisitions in our merger-

minded time, payment consisted of a ’’package” of the

acquirer’s securities.

Such a package usually contained

some common stock but mostly fixed-income securities (deben

tures or preferred stock) convertible into common at a later
time.
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If the amount of common in the package was rela
tively small in light of the earnings of the company being

acquired, the acquirer could show an immediate rise in

earnings per share.

This was simply because the divisor

applied to the combined net income of the merged companies
had been held down.

In other words, it was possible to

show a rise in earnings per share of common stock without
there having been a rise in actual net income.

The full import of a transaction of this kind
could be brought out for the benefit of investors, however,
by showing the dilutive effect on earnings per share that

would occur if the convertible securities in the package

were exchanged for common.
There are other circumstances in which dilution
could occur, and the APB therefore issued Opinion 15, which
set detailed rules as to the classes of securities that are

to be included in the divisor of net earnings, and under
what conditions.

The Board not only recommended that

earnings-per-share figures be included in corporate income

statements, it said that there should be a "primary” figure -namely, one for which the divisor is outstanding common

stock plus securities defined as common stock equivalents —
and a ’’fully diluted” figure, which takes into account all

the common that would have to be issued to satisfy all con
version privileges, warrants, options, and so on.
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Opinion 15 makes inclusion of earnings-per-share

figures in income statements not merely recommended, as in
Opinion 9, but a requisite for an unqualified opinion by a
member of the AICPA.

In the financial affairs of companies, income taxes

are obviously a major factor.

Accounting for them can involve

numerous complexities, and in the past different companies

followed different practices.
A main root of the complexities is than an item

of income or expense may be taxed in a different year from
the one in which it appears in a company’s financial state

ments to stockholder.

A prime example is depreciation.

For purposes of the usual income statement, the

cost of a machine is normally depreciated in equal annual
portions over its estimated useful life.

The Internal

Revenue Code, however, permits a faster write-off, thus

reducing a company’s income (and hence its income tax) in

the early years of the machine’s life, and increasing the
tax in the later years.

To assure a fair matching of depreciation charges
with the income tax effects arising from them, the practice

grew of making charges for taxes against current income,
even though the tax would not be paid until later.

This
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practice was encouraged in various pronouncements by the
accounting profession and was made a requirement in 1958.

The problem of appropriately matching tax charges
with income is found also in installment sales.

A company

which makes a sale at a price of $600,000 might be paid in
installments of $150,000 a year but take the full sales
price into revenues for the year the sale is made.

Income tax paid that year would include only the
tax on the gross profit on the first installment received.

If provision

for the remaining tax were made by a charge

to income for the deferred taxes, there would be no

distortion of net income.

Not all companies used to make

such a charge, however, with the result that net income was

overstated for the year of the sale and understated in
following years when the remaining tax was actually paid.

Accordingly, in Opinion 11 issued in 1967

the

APB called for ’’comprehensive allocation” of taxes, which

simply means that full provision for taxes must be made in

the same income statements in which the related income is

reported.
The element of financial reporting that aroused

more criticism from business commentators than probably
any other concerned the accounting treatment of mergers.
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And the effort that led to improvement of merger accounting

provoked argument that was both copious and intense.
Traditionally, a merger was regarded as the pur
chase of one company by another.

Payment might be in cash,

stock, or a combination of the two.

The physical assets,

and the separately calculable intangible assets, of the

acquired company were assigned values, and these figures
were entered in the appropriate accounts on the books of
the acquirer.

In the large majority of cases., however, the

price paid for the acquired company was higher than the

value of the tangible and identifiable intangible assets.
In other words, the company was worth more as a going

concern than the sum of its parts.

The question of how to account for the excess
was resolved by calling it "goodwill” and entering it on

the asset side of the acquiring company’s balance sheet.

To many people, however, this solution was less
than satisfactory.

Proper accounting requires that all

the costs involved in producing revenue be charged against

that revenue.

Goodwill was part of the cost of an acquired

revenue-generating property, yet it usually would not show

up as a charge against the revenue.

Unlike buildings or
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machinery, it would not give rise to depreciation charges.
And, unlike an intangible asset like a patent, its duration
was not determinable.

It would dangle in the company’s

accounts, unchanged, as long as the company existed.

This dilemma gave rise to another method of merger

accounting.

It was called "pooling” and was based on a con

cept not of the purchase of one company by another but of
a mingling of the two.

Thus the figures in the various

categories of accounts on the books of the two companies

were simply added together.

The assets of the acquired

company were not written up to reflect the price paid by

the acquirer, there was no dangling goodwill, and the merged
concerns were treated as though they had been a single entity
since their beginnings.

Pooling was supportable in theory and had merits
in practice.

It also proved subject to abuse, a fact which

became particularly apparent with the growth of conglomera
tion.

Since, for example, the accounts of two companies
were simply added together, the assets of an acquired com
pany appeared on the books of the merged organization at

original cost, not at what the acquirer had paid.

If one

of the assets were then sold, the difference between orig
inal cost and the price received could be counted as profit.
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To make the illustration specific, a company might issue

stock valued at $10 million to buy another company with

a book value of $5 million, operate the acquired business
at a loss, sell it for $7 million, and record a profit of

$2 million.
Moreover, under the concept that the merged com

panies had been one since their origins, Company A which
had operated at a loss for the past year might acquire

Company B, which had earned a healthy profit, and, even

if the merger occurred after the close of the year but

before the annual report was issued, Company A could
announce a profit for the year as a whole.
Last year the APB adopted rules for merger

accounting which retain boththe purchase and pooling
methods but spell out the conditions under which one method

dr the other must be applied.

The planned sale of assets

acquired in poolings is curtailed, and the inclusion in net
income for a given year of the profits of a company pooled

after the close of the year is prohibited.

When mergers

are accounted for as purchases, goodwill now must be amor
tized by charges to income over a period not to exceed
forty years.

These provisions have been

endorsed by the

SEC and the New York and American stock exchanges.
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In the past it was customary for a company that

held stock in others to report in its own income statement

only the dividends received from the investments.

Over

time, another practice known as the "equity method” began

to come into favor with accountants.

Under the previous method, a company owning a
subsidiary or holding enough stock to have significant

influence over another company could raise or lower its
own income by influencing the dividends paid to it.

Thus,

if the owning company’s income from operations was poor in

a given year, a subsidiary’s dividends might be boosted
even though the latter itself had not fared well and the

•dividends had to be paid out of earnings of earlier years.

If the subsidiary omitted dividends and sustained a net

loss for the year, the loss did not show in the parent
company’s accounts.3
Under the equity method, however, the owning com

pany takes into its own income statement its entire share

of the profit or loss of the subsidiary.
As far back as 1959 the old Committee on Accounting
Procedure recommended that the equity method be used in

accounting for any subsidiaries left out of consolidation.

3The accounting practices referred to here apply only to
subsidiaries whose results are not consolidated with the
parent company’s.
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Seven years later, Opinion 10 of the APB required use of
the equity method for unconsolidated domestic subsidiaries,

and Opinion 18 issued this year extends the requirement to
all unconsolidated subsidiaries, joint ventures and other

holdings which give the investor the ability to exercise

significant influence over operating and financial policies
of the investee.
The Opinion stipulates that an investment of 20

percent or more of the voting stock of a company will be con

sidered as indicating ability to exercise significant
influence, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

Conversely, an investment of less than 20 percent of the

voting stock will be regarded as showing that no such

influence exists, unless it can be demonstrated.
Equity accounting is required under this Opinion

not only in consolidated financial statements but in parent-

company-only financials issued as primary statements to
stockholders.

This extended use of the equity method of accounting
will give shareholders a clearer picture of how their com

pany is doing not only as viewed in connection with its con
solidated subsidiaries but in connection with its other
significant stock holdings as well.
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The two most recent Opinions issued by the APB deal

with accounting changes and imputing interest on long-term
receivables and payables.
The former limits changes in accounting methods

and standardizes the reporting of such changes when they are

made.

It restricts accounting changes to situations where it

can be demonstrated that the new method provides more useful

information to investors than the previous one.
The Opinion dealing with interest applies mainly to
purchases and sales of major assets, such as a building or a

plant, where the seller takes back a long-term note bearing

no interest or an interest rate significantly lower than the
prevailing one for a comparable instrument.

Under the

Opinion, the sale price and amount of the note are reduced
by calculating the present value of the note at an imputed

rate of interest, thereby providing a more realistic report

ing of the principal amount of the long-term receivable or
payable and the related interest income or expense.
The measures that have been discussed in this

article do not provide a complete picture of the progress
that has been made in corporate financial reporting.

They

seem sufficient, however, to demonstrate that major efforts

have been made to supply stockholders with increasing amounts

of useful information and to serve the interest of the
investing public.
remains to be done.

But while much has been accomplished, much
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Projects dealing with more than twenty areas of
accounting are presently on the agenda of the APB and in

various stages of research or committee review.

Among these are accounting for the purchase and

retirement of debt, standards for interim period reporting,
and accounting for extractive industries.
The continuing flow of pronouncements from the

accounting profession stirs occasional grumblings that CPAs

seem perversely bent on making business more and more compli
cated.

Actually, cause and effect are the other way around.

It is the increased complexity of business that makes revised

or new accounting practices necessary.

The accounting methods

of a generation ago would be no more adequate to the needs of
present business than the visually-monitored gauges and manual
controls of pre-World War II factories would be adequate for

today’s industrial plants.

The proliferation of rules has led also to a
complaint that the APB has functioned in too prescriptive a

fashion and with too much concern for detail, thereby
fashioning a strait jacket that is unduly restrictive on

both businessmen and CPAs.

It has been urged that, because

of the many judgmental factors in accounting, the APB should
limit itself to the formulation of broad principles, within

which accounting firms and their clients would work out

their own applications.
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Implicit in this point of view is a question of
degree.

Accounting most certainly involves judgmental factors.

It is not a discipline which, at the professional level, can
be learned by rote and practiced mechanically.

But this is

not the same as saying that its rules should be only of a

general nature.
Whereas some business managements and some CPA firms

might be pleased by greater permissiveness in accounting rules,
it is unlikely that the investing public, security analysts,

or legislators would be.

Indeed, a variety of interpretations

of broad concepts has been the source of much of the discontent
with accountancy.

A suggestion that the organized profession

should shun detailed rule-setting is like suggesting that,

since we have the Ten Commandments, every one should be free
to interpret them in his own way, and the enactment of laws
to regulate behavior is intolerably restrictive.

Criticism of corporate reporting is by no means a

results of sloth on the part of business, government, and the
accounting profession.

On the contrary, the record shows

numerous measures to improve the flow of information to stock
holders and to protect the public from the small minority of

executives who would deliberately mislead.

As is so often

the case, however, progress begets desire for more progress;
and desire can easily outpace means of fulfillment.
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When a society and, in particular, its business
system are dynamic, the task of keeping accounting practices
in tune with events is unending.

Toward this end, the

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants early in
1971 appointed a commission to study the setting of accounting
principles.

The commission is comprised of accountants in

public practice, business and education, as well as distinguished

persons outside accountancy.

Its mission is to appraise the

structure and methods of the Accounting Principles Board and

consider ways of improving the function of establishing
accounting principles.

The commission will report its findings and recommenda
tions early in 1972 and they are likely to have a major effect

oh the process of setting standards for corporate financial
reporting.

In view of the 40 years of steady development in

this area, the report of the commission will be another advance
toward improvement of financial reporting, in order to support
the reliability and social justification of private enter

prise management.

